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We develop a model where: (i) banks take deposits and make investments; (ii) their liabilities
facilitate third-party transactions. Other models have (i) or (ii), not both, although we argue they
are intimately connected: we show that they both emerge from limited commitment. We describe an
environment, characterize desirable allocations, and interpret the outcomes as banking arrangements.
Banks are essential: without them, the set of feasible allocations is inferior. As a technical contribution,
we characterize dynamically optimal credit allocations with frictions, show they involve backloading, and
analyse how this interacts with banking. We also confront the theory with economic history.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We develop a theory designed to capture two salient features of banking: (i) banks accept deposits
and make investments on behalf of their depositors; (ii) their liabilities, claims on said deposits,
facilitate exchange with other parties. While many models of banking consider either the first or
second feature, it is desirable to have a framework incorporating both, because the two activities
are connected in a fundamental way: as we show, both originate from limited commitment. Of
course, banks may do more—e.g. provide liquidity insurance and information processing. We
downplay these functions, as they have been studied extensively elsewhere, and focus instead
on banks arising endogenously as a response to commitment problems. Commitment issues are
central because banking concerns the intertemporal allocations of resources, which hinges on
the incentive to make good on one’s obligations. In our model, banks emerge as agents that are
relatively trustworthy, in the sense that they have stronger incentives to honour promises, and
this allows claims on deposits to serve as a means of payment—i.e. as inside money.
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The formal model incorporates the following ingredients. There are two types of infinitely
lived agents. Each period is divided into two subperiods, where type 1 wants to consume in the
first and type 2 in the second. Type 1 can produce and invest in the first subperiod, thus generating
second-subperiod output valued by type 2. In a first-best world, it would be efficient to have type
2 lend to type 1, enabling the latter to consume and invest in the first subperiod, with type 2
consuming the product of the investment in the second. In the second subperiod, however, type 1
is tempted to abscond with the proceeds, as in the cash-diversion models of DeMarzo and Fishman
(2007) or Biais et al. (2007). This is more of a problem to the extent type 1 is impatient, has better
opportunities to divert the proceeds of the investments, and has a smaller probability or a higher
cost of getting caught. In general, we need to impose a repayment constraint guaranteeing type 1
does not behave opportunistically, hindering the ability to exploit intertemporal gains from trade.
We then introduce another agent, who is like the first type, but may have less incentive to
behave opportunistically, or a higher expected cost of getting caught. Even if this third agent
is less efficient than type 1 at producing second-subperiod output, when the incentive problem
is severe the following scheme is efficient: type 1 works in the first subperiod and deposits the
output with the third agent, who invests on his behalf. Since the third agent is more inclined
to deliver the goods, type 2 is willing to produce more in the first subperiod for type 1. This
resembles banking: type 1 deposits resources with, and delegates investment to, his banker; and
claims on these deposits facilitate transactions between 1 and 2. These liabilities constitute inside
money, a role played historically by banknotes, and later checks and debit cards, backed by
demand deposits. This arrangement allows type 1 to get more from type 2, compared to pure
credit, because the banker is more trustworthy than the type 1 agent. Again, this can be true even
if the banker does not have access to the highest-return investment opportunities. The function
of formal theory is to make these ideas precise, and hopefully derive new insights. We also put
the model to work in several substantive applications, and compare its predictions with some
historical observations.1
Before getting more into results we briefly discuss the methodological approach. Our aim is
to proceed with minimal prior assumptions about who banks are or what they do. The agents
that become bankers here are not fundamentally different from depositors—e.g. in terms of
preferences—although they may have less of a problem dealing with certain frictions, like
imperfect monitoring and commitment. Obviously some frictions are needed, since models like
Arrow-Debreu have no role for banks, or, for that matter, any other institution whose raison
d’être is to facilitate the process of exchange. The simplest such institution is money, and a
classic challenge in monetary economics is to ask what frictions make money essential in the
following sense (see, e.g. Wallace 2001, 2010): money is said to be essential when the set of
feasible allocations is bigger, or better, with it than without it. We similarly want to know when
banking is essential.
Here the planner, or mechanism, instructs certain agents to perform functions resembling
elements of banking. This activity is essential: if it were ruled out the set of incentive-feasible
allocations would be inferior. We call this a New Monetarist approach because it is in the tradition
of research labelled this way in recent surveys by Williamson and Wright (2010a, b) and Nosal
and Rocheteau (2011). Given the existence of these sources, this is not the place to go into detail
on the methods or models in that literature, except to say that it focuses on studying the process of
exchange explicitly, and on deriving endogenously institutions designed to facilitate that process.
1. The applications are previewed below, but we mention here that we concentrate on issues other than ones that
have been the focus of previous research, e.g. banks’ tendency to borrow short and lend long, or to make deposits available
on demand except in unusual circumstances like suspensions. These can be analysed in our framework, too, but we prefer
to discuss more novel results, like the role of claims on deposits in the exchange process.
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To pick just one example, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) set out to show that money can emerge
endogenously, and is essential, as a medium of exchange that helps deal with frictions making
direct barter difficult. Our goal is to think about banking in a similar way.2
Our analysis formalizes the idea that agents are better suited to banking (accepting and
investing deposits) when they have a good combination of the following characteristics that
make them more trustworthy (less inclined to renege on obligations):
• they are relatively patient;
• they are more visible, by which we mean more easily monitored;
• they have a greater stake in, or connection to, the economic system;
• they have access to better investment opportunities; and
• they derive lower payoffs from opportunistically diverting resources.
Some of these (like the first) points may be obvious, but others seem less so—e.g. the idea that
it may be good to delegate investments to those with a greater stake in the system, even if they
have less lucrative investment opportunities, since this facilitates transactions.
In terms of the banking literature, Gorton and Winton (2002) and Freixas and Rochet
(2008) provide surveys. Much of this work is based on information frictions, including adverse
selection, moral hazard, and costly state verification. One strand, originating with Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), interprets banks as coalitions providing liquidity insurance.3 Another approach,
pioneered by Leland and Pyle (1977) and developed by Boyd and Prescott (1986), interprets
banks as information-sharing coalitions. A related approach, following Diamond (1984) and
Williamson (1986, 1987), interprets banks as delegated monitors taking advantage of returns
to scale. Relative to these theories, although monitoring is also part of the story, we focus
more on commitment problems. Rajan (1998) previously criticized banking theory for not
concentrating more on incomplete contracts, or markets, based on limited enforcement.4 We
agree that commitment/enforcement issues are central, but we think this needs to be endogenous.
In this regard, we build on Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). We also
highlight Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a, b), where inside money also facilitates trade.5 However,
that model does not have deposits, delegated investments, loans, or endogenous monitoring. Our
approach captures these features as well as the role of bank liabilities in the exchange process.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic environment.
Section 3 discusses feasible and efficient allocations when there is a single group, consisting of
two types. This provides a simple model of credit with imperfect commitment, monitoring and
collateral, but no banks. Section 4 considers two groups, and shows it can be efficient for some
agents in one to act as bankers for the other group. Section 5 shows how to implement efficient
2. Mattesini et al. (2009) go into more detail concerning the way this approach relates to the one advocated by
Townsend (1987, 1988). This method first lays out an environment, including frictions (e.g. information or commitment
problems), and then tries to interpret outcomes (e.g. incentive-feasible or efficient allocations) in terms of institutions one
observes in actual economies. We want to know which frictions lead to banking. For this question, one cannot assume
missing markets, incomplete contracts, etc., although something like that may emerge: “the theory should explain why
markets sometimes exist and sometimes do not, so that economic organisation falls out in the solution to the mechanism
design problem” (Townsend, 1988). Relatedly, we adhere to a generalization of Wallace’s (1998) dictum: “money should
not be a primitive in monetary theory—in the same way that a firm should not be a primitive in industrial organization
theory or a bond a primitive in finance.”By extension, banks should not be a primitive in banking theory; they should
arise endogenously. See Araujo and Minetti (2011) for recent work in a similar spirit.
3. See Ennis and Keister (2009) for a recent contribution with references.
4. In addition, see Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Myers and Rajan (1998), and Diamond and Rajan (2001).
5. In addition, see Wallace (2005), Koeppl et al. (2008), Andolfatto and Nosal (2009), Huangfu and Sun (2011),
He et al. (2005,2008), Mills (2008), Sanches and Williamson (2010), and Monnet and Sanches (2012).
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allocations using inside (bank) money. Section 6 takes up various extensions, to study which
agents should be bankers, how many we should have, and how big they should be, as well as
asking how we should monitor them when it is costly, what is the tradeoff between trust and
return, and why might intermediated lending be useful.
For simplicity, most of the analysis focuses on stationary allocations. Section 7 relaxes this,
by considering efficient dynamic allocations, and shows the main economic conclusions survive.
These results probably constitute the biggest technical contribution of the article—which is for
the most part meant to be as simple as we could make it—since it was not trivial (at least to us)
to derive the properties of efficient dynamic allocations, even if the general approach goes back
a long way (at least to Thomas and Worall, 1988). In terms of substantive findings, we show
that efficient credit allocations involve backloading rewards for borrowers—e.g. offering small
loans at relatively high interest at the beginning, followed by larger loans at better terms in the
longer run. This provides the greatest incentives for borrowers to repay. Given all of this theory,
Section 8 compares the predictions of the model to some facts from banking history. Section 9
concludes.
2. THE ENVIRONMENT
Time is discrete and continues forever. There are two groups, i=a,b, each with a [0,1] measure
of agents. In a group, agents can be one of two types, j=1,2.6 We refer to agents of type j in group
i as ji (e.g. 1a is a type 1 agent in group a). Each period, each agent can be active or inactive.
Inactive agents do not consume or produce, and get utility normalized to 0, in that period. Agents
in group i are active with probability γ i and inactive with probability 1−γ i, where γ i can differ
across groups, so that they can have different degrees of connection to the economic system. In
each period there are two group-specific goods, 1i and 2i, i=a,b. What defines a group is that
agents have utility functions with only goods produced in their group as arguments. Active agents
1i consume good 1i and produce good 2i, while active agents 2i consume good 2i and produce
good 1i. Letting xj and yj denote consumption and production by agents j, utility Uj
(
xj,yj
)
is
increasing in xj, decreasing in yj and satisfies the usual differentiability and curvature conditions.
We assume Uj (0,0)=0, normal goods, and a discount factor across periods β ∈(0,1).
Each period is divided into two subperiods, and good j must be consumed in subperiod j. Thus,
type 1i agents must consume before 2i, making credit necessary. To have a notion of collateral,
good 2i is produced in the first subperiod, and invested by either type 1a or 1b, with fixed gross
return ρa or ρb in terms of second-subperiod goods (there is no investment across periods, only
across subperiods). This may be as simple as pure storage, perhaps for safekeeping, or any other
investment; merely for ease of presentation do we impose a fixed return. To generate gains from
trade in a simple way, type 2i agents cannot invest for themselves; more generally, we could let
them invest, just not as efficiently. Also, type 1i agent can invest goods produced in either group.
An important friction is this: when type 1i agents are supposed to deliver the goods, in the second
subperiod, they can renege to obtain a payoff λi per unit of diverted resources, over and above
U1(x1,y1). If λi =0, investment constitutes perfect collateral, since type 1i has no gain from
reneging when the production cost is sunk. But if λi >0, there is an opportunity cost to delivering
the goods.
Formally, diversion can be interpreted as type 1 consuming the investment returns, but this is
meant to stand in for the general idea that investors can extract resources opportunistically. Also,
6. Types are permanent. The main results go through when agents are randomly assigned types each period, but
the analysis is messier (Mattesini et al., 2009).
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when we say utility for agents is defined only over goods produced in their own group, we mean
Ui is only a function of these goods. Type 1i also gets a payoff λiy, over and above Ui, from
absconding with y units of the proceeds of investments of goods from either group. This is the
key incentive issue in the model.7 We assume U1(x1,y1)+λiρiy1 ≤U1(x1,0) for all x1 and y1,
so that ex ante it is never efficient for type 1i to produce and invest for their own consumption;
they only consider consuming the proceeds opportunistically ex post. In this setup, by design,
any trade or other interaction across groups is only interesting for its incentive effects, not for
more standard mercantile reasons. Also, we point out that there is no outside money here, so that
we can concentrate more clearly on inside money in what follows.
Although Section 7 generalizes this, for now we focus on stationary symmetric allocations.
These are given by vectors
(
xi1,y
i
1,x
i
2,y
i
2
)
for each group i, plus descriptions of cross-group
transfers, investment, and diversion. We sometimes proceed as if a planner collects production
and allocates it to investors and consumers, but this is only to ease the presentation—all the
planner really does is make suggestions concerning actions or allocations. When there are no
transfers across groups or diversion, allocations are resource feasible if xi1 =yi2 and xi2 =ρiyi1, so
we can summarize these allocations by
(
xi1,y
i
1
)
. When there is no ambiguity we drop the subscript
and write
(
xi,yi
)
. Finally, the planner/mechanism has an imperfect monitoring technology: a
deviation from suggestions in group i=a,b is detected with probability π i, and goes undetected
with probability 1−π i. This random monitoring technology differs across groups to capture the
idea that some are more visible than others, and thus, presumably, less inclined to misbehave.8
3. ONE GROUP
With a single group we drop the superscript i. Now all a planner/mechanism can do is recommend
a resource-feasible allocation (x,y) for agents in the group. This recommendation is incentive
feasible, or IF, as long as no one wants to deviate. Although we focus on the case where agents
cannot commit to future actions, suppose as a benchmark they can commit to some degree. One
notion is full commitment, at the beginning of time, even before agents know their type, chosen
at random before production, exchange, and consumption commence. Then (x,y) is IF as long as
the total surplus is positive,
S(x,y)≡U1(x,y)+U2(ρy,x)≥0. (1)
Another notion is partial commitment, where agents can commit at the beginning but only after
knowing types. Then IF allocations entail two participation constraints:
U1(x,y) ≥ 0 (2)
U2(ρy,x) ≥ 0. (3)
The situation in which we are actually interested involves no commitment. This means that,
at the start of every period there are two participation conditions:
U1(x,y)+βV1(x,y) ≥ (1−π)βV1(x,y) (4)
U2(ρy,x)+βV2(x,y) ≥ (1−π)βV2(x,y), (5)
7. The introduction of λi >0 is motivated by the idea that, although investment acts as collateral, as Ferguson
(2008) puts it “Collateral is, after all, only good if a creditor can get his hands on it.”
8. There are several ways to interpret random monitoring, but a straightforward one is to assume imperfect record
keeping: information concerning deviations simply “gets lost” with probability 1−π i across periods. Later we make
monitoring endogenous.
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Figure 1
Incentive feasible allocations
where Vj (x,y) is the continuation value of agent j. In (4) and (5) the LHS is the payoff from
following the recommendation, while the RHS is the deviation payoff.9 A deviation is detected
with probability π , which results in a punishment to future autarky with payoff 0 (one could
consider weaker punishments but this is obviously the most effective). With probability 1−π it
goes undetected and hence unpunished. Since agents are active with probability γ each period,
V1(x,y)=γ U1(x,y)/(1−β) and V2(x,y)=γ U2(ρy,x)/(1−β). From this it is immediate that
(4) and (5) hold if and only if (2) and (3) hold, so dynamic considerations for now only involve
happenings across subperiods within a period.
When agent 1 invests y, he promises to deliver ρy units of good 2 in the next subperiod, but
can always renege for a short-term gain λρy. If caught, he is punished with future autarky, and
so he delivers the goods only if
βV1(x,y)≥λρy+(1−π)βV1(x,y),
where the RHS is the payoff to behaving opportunistically, again detected with probability 1−π .
Inserting V1(x,y) and letting δ≡λ(1−β)/πγβ, this reduces to
U1(x,y)≥δρy. (6)
As shown in Figure 1, the repayment constraint (6) is a clockwise rotation of 1’s participation
constraint. This plays a prominent role in the sequel. A low β, low monitoring probability π , low
stake in the system γ , or high diversion value λ all increase δ and the temptation to default. We
say an agent is more trustworthy when he has smaller δ, which means he can credibly promise
more, and therefore would have a bigger credit limit.
The IF set with no commitment is denoted
F ={(x,y) | (3) and (6) hold}.
Clearly, F is convex, compact, and contains points other than (0,0), so there are gains from trade,
under the usual Inada conditions. For comparison, the IF set with partial commitment FP satisfies
9. At the suggestion of a referee, we mention that although we do not explicitly define a formal game, we can still
use methods from game theory, including the one-shot deviation principle—which, for our purposes, is nothing more
than the unimprovability principle of dynamic programming.
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(2) and (3), and with full commitment FF only requires (1). Notice F ⊂FP ⊂FF . In Figure 1(
xˆ,yˆ
)
is the unique point other than (0,0) where (3) and (6) intersect, and δb <δa implies (xˆb,yˆb)
is northeast of
(
xˆa,yˆa
)
. A more general result, also easy to verify, is:
Lemma 1. If δa >δb and ρa =ρb or δa =δb and ρa <ρb then Fa ⊂Fb.
One can define various notions of allocations that are Pareto optimal, or PO. The ex ante
PO allocation is the (xo,yo) that maximizes the surplus S(x,y). A natural criterion for ex post
(conditional on type) welfare, which we use below, is
W (x,y)=ω1U1(x,y)+ω2U2(ρy,x). (7)
As we vary the weights ωi in (7) we get the contract curve, or Pareto set,
P =
{
(x,y) |ρ ∂U
1(x,y)
∂x
∂U2(ρy,x)
∂y
= ∂U
2(ρy,x)
∂x
∂U1(x,y)
∂y
}
. (8)
It is possible that P∩F =∅ or P∩F =∅. Other useful results, also simple enough to state
without proofs, are given by:
Lemma 2. Given normal goods, P defines a downward-sloping curve in (x,y) space.
Lemma 3. Let
(
x′,y′
)
solve maxW (x,y) subject to (x,y)∈F . Then (x′,y′)∈P iff (6) is not
binding.
4. MULTIPLE GROUPS
Consider two groups a and b, where ρa =ρb =ρ, but δa >δb so that 1a have more of a commitment
problem than 1b. The IF set for the economy as a whole is given by allocations
(
xi,yi
)
for each
group, plus descriptions of interactions across groups, as we now discuss. Consider first a pure
transfer t: all 1b agents produce an extra t >0 units of good 2b and give it to agents 1a, who invest
it and use the proceeds for their own benefit.10 Since there are γ b/γ a active 1b agents for each
active 1a, payoffs are
Uˆ1
(
xa,ya,t
) ≡ U1(xa,ya)+λaρtγ b/γ a (9)
Uˆ1
(
xb,yb,t
)
≡ U1
(
xb,yb+t
)
. (10)
We need to analyse transfers for the following reason. We are ultimately interested in a different
scheme, where output from one group is transferred to the other group to invest, with the proceeds
transferred back.This delegated investment activity can change the IF set, but so can pure transfers.
To make the point that delegated investment can do more we must first analyse transfers.
With t >0, the participation conditions for 2i are as before,
U2
(
ρyi,xi
)
≥0, i=a,b, (11)
10. Transfers in the other direction, from 1a to 1b, are given by t <0, and it is never useful to have simultaneous
transfers in both directions. Note that t is like a lump sum tax on 1b, with the proceeds going to 1a, except it is not
compulsory: 1b can choose to not pay t, at the risk of punishment to future autarky, which happens with probability πb.
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but the repayment constraints for 1i change to11
Uˆ1
(
xi,yi,t
)
≥δiρyi, i=a,b. (12)
The IF set with t >0 satisfies (11) and (12). Notice t only enters these conditions through
Uˆ1
(
xi,yi,t
)
. Thus, when it comes time to settle obligations, t affects the continuation values
for 1a and 1b, but not short-run temptations. Since agents 1a are better off and agents 1b worse
off with t >0, this relaxes the repayment constraints in group a and tightens them in group b.
Therefore, if these constraints are binding in group a but not b, this expands the IF set.
To see just how much we can accomplish with transfers, consider the biggest t satisfying (11)
and (12). This maximization problem has a unique solution t˜, and implies allocations (x˜i,y˜i).
Clearly, t˜ rises as δb falls. Suppose, e.g. U1(x,y)=x−y, U2(ρy,x)=u(ρy)−x, and to make the
case stark λb =0. Then IF allocations in group b solve
u
(
ρyb
)
−xb ≥ 0 (13)
xb−yb−t ≥ 0. (14)
The maximum t and the implied allocation for group b are given by y˜b =y∗, x˜b =u(ρy∗) and
t˜ =u(ρy∗)−y∗, where ρu′(ρy∗)=1. In this example, production by 1b is efficient, 2b give all
their surplus to 1b, and t˜ taxes away the entire surplus of group b. Giving t˜ to 1a relaxes their
repayment constraint as much as is feasible (any t > t˜ leads to defection in group b).
We now introduce deposits, d >0, production of good 2a by 1a transferred to 1b for investment,
then transferred back for consumption by 2a. Since 1a is now only obliged to pay out ρ(ya−d)
in the second subperiod, his repayment constraint becomes12
Uˆ1(xa,ya,t)≥δaρ(ya−d). (15)
Similarly, since 1b is now obliged to pay out ρ
(
yb+dγ a/γ b),
Uˆ1
(
xb,yb,t
)
≥δbρ
(
yb+γ ad/γ b
)
. (16)
We also face a resource constraint
0≤d ≤ya. (17)
The IF set with deposits Fd is given by an allocation
(
xi,yi
)
for each group i, together with t and
d, satisfying (11) and (15) and (17).
We relax the repayment constraint in group a while tightening it in group b with d >0, as we
did with t >0, but deposits and transfers are different in the way they impact incentives: t only
affects continuation values, while d affects directly within-period temptations to renege. This
implies that deposits are essential in the technical sense: if we start with d =0, and then allow
d >0, for some parameters, the IF set expands.13 The following states this formally:
11. In case it is not clear, (12) is the condition for 1i to pay off 2i (i.e. agents in their own group). For 1a who is
meant to divert the returns from t, this can be written
λaρtγ b/γ a +βγ aUˆ1(xa,ya,t)/(1−β)≥λaρ(tγ b/γ a +ya)+(1−π )βγ aUˆ1(xa,ya,t)/(1−β),
which simplifies to (12).
12. Notice that these conditions allow transfers as well as deposits, since they use the payoffs defined in (9) and (10).
13. We are not claiming F ⊂Fd for all parameters, or for any d >0; the claim is that deposits can be essential for
some parameters when we get to choose d.
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Proposition 1. For all parameters ∃d such that F ⊂Fd; for some parameters ∃d such that
Fd\F =∅.
Proof Since any allocation in F can be supported once deposits are allowed by setting d =0,
it is trivial that F ⊂Fd . To show more allocations may be feasible with deposits, it suffices to
give an example. To make it easy, suppose λb =0, so that holding deposits does not affect the
repayment constraint in group b. Then there are some allocations for group a that are only feasible
with d >0. To see this, set t = t˜ to maximize the transfer from b to a, as discussed above. Given(
xb,yb,t
)=(x˜b,y˜b, t˜), all incentive constraints are satisfied in group b. In group a, the relevant
conditions (11) and (15) are
U2
(
ρya,xa
) ≥ 0
Uˆ1(xa,ya, t˜) ≥ δaρ(ya−d).
For any allocation such that δaρya ≥ Uˆ1(xa,ya, t˜), d >0 relaxes the repayment constraint for 1a,
and hence expands the IF set. ‖
While the example in the proof uses λb =0, this is not necessary. Suppose for both groups
U1(x,y)=u(x)−y, U2(y,x)=y−x, ρ=1, δi =δ and λi =λ∈(0,1), and consider maximizing
welfare with weights ωi1 =1 and ωi2 =0. We can summarize Fd when b makes transfers t and
accepts deposits d by pairs (xa,xb) satisfying
u
(
xa
)−xa+λt ≥ δ(xa−d) (18)
u
(
xb
)
−xb−t ≥ δ
(
xb+d
)
; (19)
and symmetrically for group a. To show deposits expand F beyond what can be achieved with
transfers, notice t >0 relaxes (18) by λt and tightens (19) by t, while d =λt/δ relaxes (18) by the
same amount and only tightens (19) by λt < t. To obtain the same level of slack in one group,
deposits require less tightening in the other. Figure 2 shows feasible outcomes in (xa,xb) space
for three cases. If t =d =0, F is the square. Using transfers but no deposits, it expands by the
dark-shaded areas. Using deposits as well further expands F to also include the light-shaded
areas.
The economic intuition is simple. Suppose that you are 1a, and want goods from 2a in exchange
for a pledge to pay him back later. When the time comes to pay up, if λa >0 you are tempted to
renege, opportunistically diverting the resources that were earmarked for settlement. This limits
your credit. Your temptation is relaxed by depositing d >0 with 1b to invest on your behalf. Of
course, we must also consider 1b’s temptation, but generally, whenever δb <δa, deposits allow
you to get more from 2a than a personal pledge. As a special case, λb =0 means 1b is totally
credible—or, his investments constitute perfect collateral—so you may as well deposit all your
resources with him. Another case of interest is πa =0, where your personal promise is worth
nothing, and therefore absent deposits you cannot trade at all. In any event, we think it is accurate
to call 1b your banker, and we expand on this idea in the next two sections.14
14. Although we find the applications in Sections 5–6 interesting, this article is written so that readers can skip any
or all of this material, and proceed directly to the analysis of optimal dynamic allocations in Section 7, if so inclined, with
no loss of conceptual continuity.
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Figure 2
Incentive feasible allocations with transfers and deposits
5. INSIDE MONEY
Having deposits used in payments is imperative for a complete model of banking, as over time
various bank-issued instruments have played this role, from notes to checks to debit cards. This
is one of the most commonly understood functions of banking, as evidenced by Selgin’s (2007)
entry on “Banks” for Encyclopedia Britannica:
Genuine banks are distinguished from other kinds of financial intermediaries by the readily
transferable or “spendable” nature of their IOUs, which allows those IOUs to serve as
a means of exchange, that is, money. Commercial bank money today consists mainly of
deposit balances that can be transferred either by means of paper orders known as checks
or electronically using plastic “debit” cards.
Most formal banking models fail to speak to this issue. In Diamond–Dybvig, e.g. agents with
a desire to consume withdraw deposits and eat them. Presumably this is not meant to be taken
literally, but stands in for the idea that they want to buy something. But why cannot they buy it
using claims on deposits as a means of payment? We understand that the model is not intended to
address this question. But then, as useful as it may be for some purposes, the model is incomplete.
Inside money does aid in transactions in Cavalcanti–Wallace, but that has nothing that resembles
deposits or investment. A complete model ought to have both.
We proceed by first presenting a relatively heuristic discussion, then give the equations to
make the ideas precise. The question with which we begin is, how can a mechanism keep track
of agents’ actions in the arrangement discussed above? One way that seems especially appealing
when record keeping is imperfect or costly is the following: when an agent 1a wants to consume
in the first subperiod, he produces and deposits output ya with an agent 1b in exchange for a
receipt. Think of this receipt as a bearer note for ρya. He gives this note to 2a in exchange for
his consumption good xa. Naturally, 2a accepts it, since the note is backed by the promise of the
trustworthy 1b. Agent 2a carries this note to the second subperiod, when he wants to consume
(here he wants to consume with probability 1, but it is not hard to make it random, if one wants the
setup to look more like Diamond–Dybvig). At that point 2a redeems the note for his consumption
good. Banker 1b pays 2a out of deposits—principle plus return on investments—to clear, or settle,
the obligation. See Figure 3.15
15. Another scheme, suggested by Chris Phelan, that one might consider is this: suppose 1a gives his output directly
to 2a who then gives it to 1b to invest. This has deposits and delegated investment, but not inside money. One can rule
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Figure 3
Inside money
To make this more precise, we need to be specific about how agents meet and what is observed.
Therefore, we now explicitly interpret groups a and b as inhabiting different locations, or islands,
to use a metaphor common in the search literature. To ease the exposition, let γ i =ρi =1, U1 =
u(x)−y and U2 =u(y)−x. Also, let πa =0<πb. To discuss circulating paper, we assume that
any agent can costlessly produce indivisible, durable, intrinsically worthless objects that could,
in principle, function as bearer notes. To avoid technical details, we assume agents can store at
most one note. This does not affect the interesting results, but it means we do not have to rule
out potential deviations where agents accumulate multiple notes over time, and cash them in
bundles—which they do not want to do, anyway, but it clutters the presentation to have to prove
it. In passing, we mention that this is actually an assumption shared with Cavalcanti–Wallace, as
well as many of the earlier search-based models of outside money.
Meetings occur as follows. Within each group j, each agent 1j is randomly matched with
one 2j for the entire period. We know from standard arguments (e.g. Wallace, 2010) that some
medium of exchange is necessary for trade on island a, given πa =0, but notes issued by 1a have
no value because 1a has no incentive to redeem them. And these notes cannot have value as fiat
objects, since no one would give up anything to get one when he can print his own for free. This
is not the case for notes issued by 1b. In addition to the above matching structure, before 1j and 2j
pair off, 1a agents travel to island b, and meet some 1b at random. Then, in subperiod 2, agent 2a
can travel to island b and meet anyone they like—i.e. search by 2a is directed. This means that 2a
takes the note back to the same 1b agent that issued it. Alternatively, one could imagine setting up
the model so that type 1b agents redeem notes issued by any bank, as in Cavalcanti et al. (1999);
this may have interesting consequences, but for now we take the route of directed search, along
the lines of Corbae et al. (2003). In any case, for completeness we have to specify what happens
if n>1 agents of type 2a try to match with the same 1b agent. In this case, we assume that all n
have the same probability 1/n, but only one actually meets (can trade with) him.
that out, however, by assuming 2a cannot transport first-subperiod goods, just like they cannot invest them. This makes
the receipts or bearer notes essential.
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Now consider a simple mechanism that suggests a particular set of actions—basically,
meetings and trades—but agents can either accept or reject suggestions. If in a meeting both
agents accept, they implement a suggested trade; otherwise, there is no trade in the meeting.
If someone rejects a suggested trade, as above, with probability π i they are punished with future
autarky. There are four types of trades we need to consider: (1) when 1a meets 1b, the former
should produce and deposit d =ya in exchange for the latter’s note; (2) when 1a meets 2a, the
latter should produce xa in exchange for a note if the former has one, and otherwise there is no
trade; (3) when 2a meets the 1b who issued the note, the latter redeems it for ya; and (4) within
group b, xb is produced by 2b for 1b in the first subperiod and yb is delivered to 2b in the second,
as in the previous sections, without using notes.
To describe payoffs, let v˜a1 (m) be the expected utility of 1
a when he meets 1b and va1 (m) his
expected utility when he meets 2a, given he has m∈{0,1} notes. Then
v˜a1 (0) = va1 (1)−ya
v˜a1 (1) = va1 (1)
va1 (1) = u
(
xa
)+β v˜a1(0)
va1 (0) = β v˜a1(0).
Thus, if 1a has m=0 when he meets 1b, he produces/deposits ya in exchange for a note, while if
m=1 they do not trade. Then, when 1a meets 2a, if m=1 he swaps the note for xa, while if m=0
he leaves without consuming, and in either case starts next period with m=0. Similarly, for 2a
va2 (0) = v˜a2 (1)−xa
va2 (1) = v˜a2 (1)
v˜a2 (1) = u
(
ya
)+βva2 (0)
v˜a2 (0) = βva2 (0),
where va2 (m) is the payoff when 2
a has m notes and meets 1a, while v˜a2 (m) is the payoff when he
meets 1b. Since πa =0, on island a the relevant incentive conditions are va1 (1)−ya ≥va1 (0)≥0
and v˜a2 (1)−xa ≥ v˜a2 (0)≥0, which reduce to
u
(
xa
) ≥ ya (20)
u
(
ya
) ≥ xa. (21)
Let v˜b1 be the payoff of 1
b
, a representative banker, when he meets 1a, and vb1 his payoff when
he meets 2b in the first subperiod. Let vˆb1 (a) be his payoff when he meets 2
a and vˆb1 (b) his payoff
when he meets 2b in the second subperiod. Then
v˜b1 =vb1 =u
(
xb
)
−yb+ vˆb1 (a)
vˆb1 (a)= vˆb1 (b)=β v˜b1.
The important decision for 1b is repayment. If he reneges on either 2a or 2b, he is detected and
punished with probability πb. But 2a only gets ya if he gives 1b one of his notes; otherwise,
the mechanism says 1b can use the resources for his own benefit λbya. It is this part of the
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implementation scheme that gives 2a the incentive to produce for a note in the first place. The
payoff for 2b is vb2 =u
(
yb
)−xb+βvb2, which we need to consider, of course, since we need 2b to
produce for 1b—this is how we give 1b an equilibrium payoff that provides him with the incentive
to honour his obligations. Therefore, the incentive conditions for group b reduce to
u
(
yb
)
≥ xb (22)
u
(
xb
)
≥ yb (23)
u
(
xb
)
−yb ≥ δb
(
yb+ya
)
. (24)
Given the utility functions used here, (22) and (23) are the participation constraints, and (24)
is the repayment constraint, for group b described earlier. Similarly, for group a (20) and (21) are
the participation constraints, and there is no repayment constraint given πa =0. Summarizing,
we have:
Proposition 2. Any (xa,ya) and
(
xb,yb
)
satisfying (20)–(24) can be decentralized using
banknotes. Since these same constraints define the IF set, any IF allocation can be decentralized
in this way.
In terms of economics, deposit-backed paper issued by b is used as a payment instrument by
a, which is essential since πa =0 implies there is no trade on island a when d =0. In equilibrium,
all transactions on island a are now spot trades of goods for notes—i.e. the economy has been
fully monetized. This is related to the use of currency in models like Kiyotaki and Wright (1993),
except we use bank liabilities rather than fiat objects. The difference from most banking theory
is that our bank liabilities facilitate transactions. The difference from Cavalcanti–Wallace banks
is that our banks do more than issue notes, they also take deposits and make investments.
6. EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
Having shown that banking is essential, and that IF allocations can be decentralized using deposit-
backed notes, we take up other questions. For this, we use welfare criterion (7), with the same
weights in each groups: ωaj =ωbj .
6.1. Who should hold deposits?
With two groups and δa >δb, we claim it may be desirable in a Pareto sense to have group a
deposit resources with group b, but not the other way around. Let(
xi0,y
i
0
)
=argmaxWi
(
xi,yi
)
s.t.
(
xi,yi
)
∈F i (25)
be the best IF allocation in group i with no transfers or deposits. At
(
xi0,y
i
0
)
, we obviously cannot
make type 1i better off without making type 2i worse off, or vice-versa, given d =0. So, we ask,
can we make agents in one group better off without hurting the other group with d =0? If deposits
can help, in this regard, we say they are Pareto essential, or PE.16
16. Essentiality means the IF set becomes bigger or better. By PE, we mean better, according to (25). Also note that
transfers cannot help here, since they make one group worse off, so we ignore them.
[14:04 4/4/2013 rds037_online.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 649 636–662
GU ET AL. BANKING: A NEW MONETARIST APPROACH 649
y
x
(x ,y )a a0 0
a
b
(x ,y )* *
U ( y,x)=02
(x ,y )a ad d
(x ,y )=b b0 0 (x ,y )
b b
d d
Figure 4
Pareto essential deposits
Consider the allocation that, for some d, solves(
xid,y
i
d
)
=argmaxWi
(
xi,yi
)
s.t.
(
xi,yi
)
∈F id (26)
where, compared to (25), the constraint set in (26) is now F id . Deposits are PE if there is d such
that Wi
(
xid,y
i
d
)≥Wi(xi0,yi0) for both i with one strict inequality.
Proposition 3. Deposits from a to b are PE iff the repayment constraint binds for a and not b.
We omit a formal proof (see Mattesini et al., 2009), but the idea is simple: if the repayment
constraint binds in one group, but not the other, bankers should be selected from the latter.
Suppose, e.g. Fa ⊂Fb. Then, since the welfare weights are the same, if the repayment constraint
does not bind in group a at
(
xa0,y
a
0
)
then it cannot bind in b. This is shown in Figure 4 for a case
in which the best unconstrained allocation
(
x∗,y∗
)
is not feasible in either group. When d =0,(
xb0,y
b
0
)∈P solves (25) for group b, but the commitment problem is so severe in group a that(
xa0,y
a
0
)
/∈P . Introducing d >0 as a fraction of y rotates in the repayment constraint for group b
and rotates out the one for group a. This has no effect on group b, since
(
xb0,y
b
0
)
is still feasible,
but makes group a better off.
6.2. How should we monitor?
We now choose monitoring intensity, and thus endogenize δi. Assume monitoring in group i with
probability π i implies a utility cost π iki. Define a new benchmark with d =0 as the solution
(xi,yi,π i) to
max
(x,y,π )
Wi (x,y)−πki s.t. (x,y)∈F i and π ∈[0,1]. (27)
Notice the repayment constraint must bind, U1
(
xi,yi
)=δiρyi, since otherwise we could reduce
monitoring costs. Also notice that
(
x∗,y∗
)
is generally not efficient when monitoring is
endogenous, since reducing π implies a first-order gain while moving away from
(
x∗,y∗
)
entails
only a second-order loss.
Suppose for the sake of illustration that we want to minimize total monitoring costs. For now,
assume there is exactly one active type 1 agent, which means there is a single candidate banker, in
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each group at each date. Obviously, if agents in one group deposit with the other, we can reduce
monitoring costs in the former only by increasing it in the latter. Still, this may be desirable. In
the Appendix we prove that if γ b ≥γ a, λb ≤λa and kb ≤ka, then d >0 may be desirable but d <0
can never be. Also, we show that when 1b has a big enough stake in the economy, he should hold
all the deposits, so that we can give up monitoring agents 1a entirely.
Proposition 4. Fix (xa,ya) and
(
xb,yb
)
. If γ b ≥γ a, λb ≤λa, and kb ≤ka, then efficient
monitoring implies δb <δa. Also, if γ b >γ¯ , defined in the proof, then πa =0.
Other applications of endogenous monitoring are available (see Mattesini et al., 2009). One can
show, e.g. that d >0 may be desirable even if 1a must compensate 1b for increased monitoring
costs. One can also consider the efficient number of bankers, more generally. Fewer bankers
reduce total monitoring cost, but this means more deposits per bank, so that we might need to
monitor them more rigorously. In fact, even if there is only one group, if one considers asymmetric
allocations, it can be desirable to designate some subset of the type 1b agents as bankers, and
concentrate all monitoring on them. We leave further exploration of these ideas to future work.
6.3. Rate of return dominance
To this point we assumed ρa =ρb, but, by continuity, of course deposits in group b can be PE
even if ρa >ρb. Heuristically, this explains why individuals keep wealth in demand deposits,
despite the existence of alternatives with higher yields: deposits are better payment instruments.
In other words, deposits are more liquid. Still, there is an interaction between liquidity and return
worth making precise. The next result is also proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 5. If d >0 is PE when ρb =ρa, there exists ε>0 such that d >0 is PE when ρb =
ρa−ε. Deposits in group b are PE if δa >δa, and either: (a) δb ≤δb and δaρ>(ρ−1)u′
(
ρya
)
;
or (b) δb >δb and δaρ>δb+(ρ−1)u′
(
ρya
)
, with the thresholds δa, δb and ya defined in the
proof.
6.4. Intermediated lending
To this point banks undertake investments directly. In reality, although banks do invest some
deposits directly, they also lend to borrowers who then make investments. The reason this is
worth mentioning is that once we introduce borrowers explicitly, one may wonder how they can
credibly commit to repay the bank but not depositors. What is the use of banks as intermediaries
if depositors can lend directly to investors? To address this, we now suppose there is a third group
c, as well as a and b. For illustration, all parameters are the same across groups, except πb >
πc >πa =0. Also, ρa =ρb =1, and in all groups, U1(x,y)=u(x)−y and U2(y,x)=u(y)−x. To
incorporate lending, agents in group c have a special technology f (I) that requires at least I¯ units
of good ya. Precisely, for I < I¯ we have f (I)=0, and for I ≥ I¯ , we have f (I)=αI with α>1.
All is well if the minimum investment I¯ is small. But when it is large, I¯ may be too expensive
for a single group a agent to lend to a group c investor. Absent other frictions, the solution is to
have many 1a agents lend to a given group c investor. But suppose we add an additional friction,
that agents in group c can meet at most n other agents each period.17 Now direct lending may fail,
17. We do not regard this as particularly deep; it is simply an example to show how other frictions can interact with
limited commitment.
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as 1a would have to produce enough ya to meet the minimum investment threshold, which may
not be worthwhile. And since πa =0, it is impossible for group a lenders to pool their resources,
and have one agent 1a lend it all to some agent 1c, since the designated 1a agent would certainly
run off with the proceeds. Here is where intermediated lending can help: a trustworthy agent
1b collects resources from many agents 1a, and lends them to a 1c investor. Delegating lending
through a bank allows us to meet the minimum investment level, despite commitment problems
within group 1.
To fill in the details, first, note that πa =0 implies group a cannot consume at all without
deposits. In principle, 1a could deposit resources with 1b for direct investment, but it may be
desirable for 1b to lend the deposits to 1c, if f (·) constitutes a better opportunity. When group a
lends d =ya directly to group c, the relevant incentive constraints for group a are
u
(
xa
)−ya ≥0 and u(αya)−xa ≥0.
Similarly, for b and c,
u
(
yb
)
−xb ≥ 0 and u
(
xb
)
−yb ≥δbyb
u
(
yc
)−xc ≥ 0 and u(xc)−yc ≥δc(αn˜ya+yc),
where n˜≤n is the number of agents 1 in group a pooling their resources for lending, with n˜ya ≥ I¯ .
Since an agent 1c can meet at most n agents, assuming symmetry, the minimum resources that
each 1a must commit is I¯/n. If u
(
αI¯/n
)
< I¯/n, this is too large for direct lending by group a to
be viable.
With intermediated lending, the relevant constraints are the same for group a, but now for
group b they are
u
(
yb
)
−xb ≥0 and u
(
xb
)
−yb ≥δb
(
yb+ nˆya−d+αd
)
.
The total amount received by banker 1b from nˆ agents in group a is nˆya, of which he lends d ≤ nˆya
to agents in group c. In the second subperiod, these loans return αd. Given he also invests yb
for agents in his own group, his repayment constraint is as given above. For group c the relevant
constraints are
u
(
yc
)−xc ≥0 and u(xc)−yc ≥δc(αn˜d+yc),
where n˜d ≥ I¯ , and n˜≤n is the number of bankers lending d to an investor. If n˜>1, the minimum
investment is I¯/n˜n< I¯/n.
For n˜ large, u
(
αI¯/n˜n
)
> I¯/n˜n, and the IF set for group a contains points other than autarky.
The smaller is δb, the larger we can set n˜. We conclude that intermediated lending can be PE, if we
add additional frictions, and in particular if there is a large fixed investment I¯ . This is reasonable,
since firms often need funds beyond what a single lender can provide. Moreover, a single lender
may not want the risk exposure implied by single large investment, although we do not model
this explicitly. The point is that we can extend the framework to explain how banks usefully
intermediate between depositors and investors, based in part on limited commitment, and in part
on other frictions.
7. NON-STATIONARY ALLOCATIONS
So far, we have restricted attention to stationary allocations. One might suspect that relaxing
stationarity could be good for incentives, and if this works too well, deposits may no longer be
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Figure 5
Stationary participation and repayment constraints
PE. Clearly, this is not true in general—e.g. if πa =0 then the only IF allocation in group a with
d =0 is autarky, and so it seems obvious that d >0 can be PE. But it would be good to know how
the results are affected, by relaxing stationarity, more generally. This is the issue studied here. We
assume ρ=λ=γ =1, for this exercise, mainly to ease the presentation, and start with a single
group.
To begin, we identify three points of reference. Let (x,y) be the stationary allocation given by
the intersection of the stationary Pareto set P with 1’s stationary repayment constraint, and let
V1 =U1(x,y)/(1−β) be the associated payoff for 1. Let (x¯,y¯) be the intersection of P with 2’s
stationary participation constraint and V¯1 =U1(x¯,y¯)/(1−β). Let (xˆ,yˆ) =(0,0) be the intersection
of 1’s stationary repayment constraint with 2’s participation constraint and Vˆ1 =U1(xˆ,yˆ)/(1−β).
Figure 5 shows these reference points for two cases, with the same preferences, but in the left
panel the stationary repayment constraint is loose, which implies x¯< xˆ, and in the right it is tight,
which implies x¯> xˆ. On the left, we show 1’s indifference curves associated with V1 and V¯1, but
not Vˆ1, since the latter does not play a role when the repayment constraint is loose; on the right,
we show 1’s indifference curves associated with Vˆ1, which is relevant when repayment is tight.
For a single group, consider the recursive Pareto problem
V2(V1)= max
x,y,V1+1
U2(y,x)+βV2(V1+1) (28)
s.t. V1 =U1(x,y)+βV1+1 (29)
βπV1+1 ≥y (30)
V2(V1+1)≥0, (31)
where the subscript on V1+1 indicates next period. The objective is to maximize V2 taking as
given V1, where of course we only consider V1 ≥0, to satisfy 1’s participation constraint at the
initial date. Constraint (29), often called “promise keeping” in the literature, is the law of motion
for V1; (30) is the dynamic repayment constraint for 1; and (31) is the dynamic participation
constraint for 2, guaranteeing he does not defect next period. This problem is complicated by the
fact that the value function V2 appears in the constraint (31), rendering it a non-standard dynamic
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program. But, using standard methods,18 we can replace (31) with V1+1 ≤ V˜1, where V˜1 is the
largest payoff we can give to type 1 such that the problem has a solution with V2 ≥0. Note that
V2(V˜1)=0.
Given this, one can determine the upper bound V˜1 explicitly, and characterize the dynamic
outcome as a function of the initial condition V10 , for two cases depicted by the two situations in
Figure 5. Proofs of the next two Propositions, which constitute the main technical contribution
of the article, are somewhat lengthy and are available in the Appendix.
Proposition 6. Suppose x¯< xˆ (repayment loose). Then the upper bound is V˜1 = V¯1. If V10 ∈
[V1,V¯1], the efficient allocation is stationary at the intersection of P and the indifference
curve U1(x,y)= (1−β)V10 . If V10 ∈[0,V1) the efficient allocation is non-stationary, V1t is strictly
increasing in t until it converges to some V1∞∈[V1,V¯1], and (30) is binding during the transition.
Proposition 7. Suppose x¯> xˆ (repayment tight). Then the upper bound is V˜1 = Vˆ1. If V10 = Vˆ1 the
efficient allocation is stationary at (xˆ,yˆ). If V10 ∈[0,Vˆ1) the efficient allocation is non-stationary,
V1t is strictly increasing in t and converges to V1∞= Vˆ1. In either case, V10 = Vˆ1 or V10 < Vˆ1, (30)
is always binding.
In terms of economics, suppose the stationary repayment constraint is loose. Then, if we want
to treat 1 well at the initial date, in the sense that V10 ≥V1, the efficient outcome is stationary; and
if we want to treat him less well, in the sense that V10 <V
1
, then V1t increases with t. In the latter
case, the efficient way to encourage repayment is to backload 1’s rewards. In practice, this can
take the form of offering small loans at high interest at the beginning, followed by larger loans
at better terms. Intuitively, it is wasteful to give 1 a stationary payoff high enough to discourage
misbehaviour, since over time past rewards become sunk, and no longer affect incentives. This
does not matter if we want to treat 1 well, but if we want to treat him less well, it is better to
give him an increasing sequence of utilities. But V1t cannot increase indefinitely, since we have to
satisfy 2’s participation, so V1t →V1∞. In the other case, when the stationary repayment constraint
is tight, except for the extreme case V10 = Vˆ1 the outcome is always nonstationary, backloading
1’s rewards for the same reason. Also note that, in either case, the dynamic repayment constraint
always binds along the transition path.
The above results fully characterize the solution with one group. With two groups, there
are several possibilities. First, suppose repayment is loose in both, and in group a the initial
condition is V1a0 <V
1a while in b it is V1b0 >V
1b
. Ignoring deposits, from Proposition 6, the
efficient allocation is stationary and unconstrained by repayment in b, while it is non-stationary
and constrained in a. It is obvious that in this case d >0 is PE, since deposits relax a binding
constraint for a without affecting b. Indeed, we can set d = d¯, so that the repayment constraint
just binds for b, and get the maximum slack for a. The resulting allocation for a may now be
stationary. To see this, notice that d >0 rotates the repayment constraint in Figure 5, moving
(xa,ya) to the northwest along Pa and lowering V1a =U1(xa,ya)/(1−β). This may reverse the
inequality V1a0 <V
1a
, making the efficient allocation for a stationary. Hence, if we have enough
slack in group b, by letting type 1b be the banker for 1a we can relax the latter’s constraints
so that we no longer need backloading. Even if d¯ is not big enough to reverse V1a0 <V
1a
, so
18. These techniques go back to Thomas and Worrall (1988); see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) for a textbook
treatment.
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we still need backloading, deposits are still PE because they slacken repayment for a along the
transition.19
So far we assumed V1b0 >V
1b
. We can also have V1i0 <V
1i for i=a and i=b, with a non-
trivial transition for both groups. Now the problem is more intricate, but it seems clear that dt >0
cannot be PE for all t since this only slackens repayment in one group at the expense of the other.
However, dt >0 may be PE at some t in the future. Thus, over time V1bt →V1b∞ , and suppose we
get there in finite time, before V1at converges. If repayment no longer binds in group b, but is still
binding in a, it is efficient to set d >0 since it will not hurt b. There is also the case where the
repayment constraint is tight for both groups, or tight for one and loose for the other. In general,
there are non-trivial transitions, and dynamically efficient allocations can be complicated. But the
goal here is to show that d >0 can be PE, not that d >0 is always PE. This has been established.
While there is much more one can do with this model, in terms of both theory and quantitative
work, we leave that to future research.
To summarize the main point, consider what we think of as the leading case: in group b,
repayment is loose and V1b0 >V
1b
, so the efficient outcome is stationary; in group a, repayment is
either loose and V1a0 <V
1a
, or repayment is tight, both of which imply backloading for 1a. Then
we can set d = d¯ >0, so repayment just binds in group b, and relax the constraint for a. In the case
where in group a repayment is loose and V1a0 <V
1a
, this may reverse the inequality and render
the outcome stationary. This means that banking may replace backloading. In any case, d = d¯
relaxes constraints for group a. Also, notice that we can do no better if we use a non-stationary
banking scheme: setting dt = d¯ for all t maximizes slack in group a. We are not saying the optimal
dt must be constant, and if it were, e.g. costly to use deposits, one might want dt to decline over
time. But absent ad hoc reasons, there is nothing to gain from non-stationary dt . At least, this is
so in the leading case where repayment is loose and the efficient outcome is stationary in group b.
We close this section by mentioning that this model, while bearing some similarity to
other dynamic models with incentive problems, e.g. Atkeson and Lucas (1992), also has some
interesting differences. In particular, our model does not lead to immiseration, where a small set
of agents eventually end up with the entire surplus. In any case, we collect some of the main
results here as follows:
Proposition 8. Consider optimal allocations with dt =0, and suppose that at t =0 the repayment
constraint does (does not) bind for group a (group b). Then dt = d¯ >0 for all t is PE, and we can
do no better by having dt vary with t. Given dt = d¯, the efficient dynamic allocation is stationary
for b, and can either be stationary or non-stationary for a, depending on whether d¯ lowers V1a
enough to reverse the inequality V1a0 >V
1a
.
8. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BANKING
Above we have presented some theory and a variety of applications of the abstract model. Now we
compare the results with some facts from banking history. First, as regards abstracting from outside
money, this seems reasonable from the historical perspective, since institutions that accepted
commodity deposits were operating long before the invention of coinage, let alone fiat currency.
19. One has to be slightly careful with this case. Proposition 6 says the transition in group a takes us to V1a∞ ∈
[V1a,V¯1a], and it is important to note that we can get there in finite time, and can end up in the interior of the interval
(since in discrete time we jump a finite distance at each step). Once we get to V1a∞ , if it is interior, then from Proposition
6 one might think repayment is no longer binding and hence d >0 is no longer PE. But this is not right, since repayment
is no longer binding only because we have d >0.
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As Davies (2002) describes the situation, in ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt, goods were often
deposited in palaces or temples, and later, private houses.
Grain was the main form of deposits at first, but in the process of time other deposits were
commonly taken: other crops, fruit, cattle and agricultural implements, leading eventually
and more importantly to deposits of the precious metals. Receipts testifying to these deposits
gradually led to transfers to the order not only of depositors but also to a third party. In the
course of time private houses also began to carry on such deposit business ... The banking
operations of the temple and palace based banks preceded coinage by well over a thousand
years and so did private banking houses by some hundreds of years.
Importantly, deposit receipts were transferrable, and hence facilitated transactions and
payments, as in the model. In ancient Babylon, also, as Ferguson (2008) says: “Debts were
transferable, hence ‘pay to the bearer’ rather than a named creditor. Clay receipts or drafts were
issued to those who deposited grain or other commodities at royal palaces or temples.”And, also
as in the model, “the foundation on which all of this rested was the underlying credibility of a
borrower’s promise to repay.” This is, of course, exactly what the model was designed to capture.
In his discussion of medieval Venetian bankers, Mueller (1997) describes two types of
deposits: regular, which were actual goods that bankers had to deliver on demand; and irregular,
involving specie or coins that only had to be repaid with the same value, but not the same objects.
The former were like modern-day safety-deposit boxes; the latter were more like demand deposits,
and involved a tacit agreement that the banker would invest the resources. When one puts one’s
money in a modern bank account, one usually does not expect to withdraw the same money, only
something of appropriate value. This is true in the model, too: a bank’s liability is not the deposit
per se, but the returns on investments. Because they are making investments, banks are more
than mere storage facilities, although safekeeping may have something to do with it. Consider
the English goldsmiths, who many regard as the first modern bankers (Joslin 1954; Quinn 1997;
Selgin 2010). Originally they offered depositors mainly security, but early in the 17th century
their deposit receipts began circulating in place of cash for payments, the first incarnation of
banknotes; shortly after, deposits could be transferred by drawn note (checks).20
Institutions of the type modelled here—i.e. acceptors of commodities on deposit that end
up facilitating transactions—were common well after the emergence of modern banking. In
colonial Virginia, e.g. tobacco was commonly used in transactions because of the scarcity of
precious metals, and the practice of depositing tobacco in public warehouses and then exchanging
certificates, attesting to its quality and quantity, survived for over 200 years (Galbraith, 1975).
Similarly, in the 19th century, to facilitate transactions and credit arrangements between cocoon
producers and silk weavers, warehouses commonly stored dried cocoons or silk and issued
warrants that could be used to pledge for credit. The first of these warehouses was funded by a
group of entrepreneurs in Lyons in 1859, and later imitated by a series of Italian banks (Federico,
1997). What we take away from these examples is that a very important feature of much early, and
some more modern, deposit banking is that claims on deposits were used to facilitate exchange.
In Venice, Mueller (1997) says deposit banking served “a function comparable to that of
checking accounts today ... not intended primarily for safekeeping or for earning interest but
rather as a means of payment which facilitated the clearance of debts incurred in the process
20. Although many say goldsmiths were the first modern bankers, others mention the Templars (Weatherford,
1997), who during the crusades specialized in moving and protecting money and other valuables. But it is not clear if
their liabilities circulated as a means of payment, the way goldsmiths’ receipts did. Some say that, before the goldsmiths,
transferring funds from one account to another “generally required the presence at the bank of both payer and payee”(Kohn,
1999; see also Quinn, 2004). Even so, deposits facilitated payments. On checks, Spufford (1988) says the Florentines
were using these as early as 1368.
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of doing business. In short, the current account constituted ‘bank money,’ money based on the
banker’s promise to pay.” Of course, this only works if bankers are trustworthy. The medieval
Rialto banks offer evidence consistent with this: “Little capital was needed to institute a bank,
perhaps only enough to convince the guarantors to pledge their limited backing and clients to
deposit their money, for it was deposits rather than funds invested by partners which provided
bankers with investable capital. In the final analysis, it was the visible patrimony of the banker—
alone or as part of a fraternal compagnia—and his reputation as an operator on the market place
in general which were placed on the balance to offset risk and win trust”(Mueller, p. 97, emphasis
added).
Many bankers historically started as merchants, who almost by definition have a big connection
to the market. The great banking families in Renaissance Italy and Southern Germany in the
16th century were originally merchants, who began lending their own capital, and then started
collecting deposits from other merchants, nobles, clerics, and small investors. They were not the
richest individuals: wealth was then concentrated in the hands of landowners, who controlled
agriculture, forests and mineral rights. But merchants arguably had the most to lose in terms of
reputation from reneging on obligations: “because commerce involved the constant giving and
receiving of credit, much of a merchant’s effort was devoted to ensuring that he could fulfill his
own obligations and that others would fulfill theirs.”(Kohn, 1999). Further evidence on the bankers
having a big connection to the market is given by Pressnell (1956) in its study of early English
country banks during the Industrial Revolution: almost all of these emerged as a by-product of
some other economic activity, often some kind of manufacturing.
Bankers also were subject to some kind of monitoring, like we emphasized in the model. For
instance, “to maintain ‘public faith,’ the Senate in 1467 reminded bankers of their obligation to
show their account books to depositors upon request.”(Mueller, p. 45). If caught cheating, the
punishment was indeed lifetime banishment from Venetian banking, but this apparently happened
rarely in history (like in the model). Going back to Roman times, Orsingher (1967) observes:
“One of the most important techniques used by Roman bankers was the use of account books
analogous to those which all citizens kept with scrupulous care. This account-book was called a
Codex and was indispensable in drawing up contracts ....Aprocedure peculiar to bankers deserves
to be noted: the ‘editio rationum’ or production of accounts. Anyone running a bank could be
compelled at a moment’s notice to produce his accounts for his clients’, or even for a third party’s,
inspection.”
Once again returning to Venice:
In the period from about 1330 to 1370, eight to ten bankers operated on the Rialto at
a given time. They seem to have been relatively small operators on average... Around
1370, however, the situation changed [and] Venetian noble families began to dominate the
marketplace. After the banking crisis of the 1370s and the War of Chioggia, the number of
banchi di scritta operating at any given time on the Rialto dropped to about four, sometimes
as few as three. These banks tended, therefore, to be larger and more important than before.
(Mueller, p. 82)
We also tried to formalize issues concerning the efficient number of bankers, revolving around
credibility vs. size, since obviously a bank can be “too big not to fail.” To summarize the general
point, while we are not experts on history, this evidence on the whole seems to illustrate how the
model is broadly consistent with the facts.
Finally, in terms of more recent history, what about banking panics and the recent financial
crisis? Gorton (2010) argues the crisis was a wholesale panic, where some financial firms
ran on others by not renewing repurchase agreements, similar to commercial bank customers
withdrawing deposits. The location of subprime risk was unknown, depositors were confused,
and consequently ran. Our approach is too stylized to capture all the intricacies, but we can use
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it to think about the big picture. Suppose the probability of being active each period γ is subject
to shocks, and uncertainty surrounding these shocks can induce agents to reduce deposits to re-
establish incentives. Such shocks depend on the nature of business, e.g. γ could be affected by
housing markets if one’s business is originating mortgage loans. As γ goes down, banking works
less well, but this is as it should be: when the frictions increase it can be efficient for credit to
dry up. We do not claim recent events were not problematic; only that it is interesting to look at
them through the lens of this model.
9. CONCLUSION
We began by specifying preferences, technologies, and frictions, including imperfect commitment
and monitoring. We then examined incentive-feasible and efficient outcomes, and tried to interpret
these in terms of arrangements observed in actual economies. The model illustrates how it can be
desirable for some agents to perform certain functions resembling banking: they accept deposits,
they invest or make loans, and their liabilities facilitate transactions among other parties. Banking
is essential: without it, the set of feasible allocations is inferior. We showed how to implement
good outcomes using circulating bank liabilities. Also, it helps if banks offer high interest rates,
but it can also be efficient to sacrifice return for trust. We explored various other issues, such as
endogenous monitoring and intermediated lending. We also solved for efficient dynamic credit
allocations, showed how they generally can entail backloading, and discussed how this interacts
with banking. Finally, we discussed some history related to the theory. This is all in the spirit of
what is called the New Monetarist approach.
The framework can be generalized to analyse other commonly discussed phenomena, e.g.
the tendency of banks to borrow short and lend long. We concentrated on different issues, like
deriving a set of characteristics that make for good bankers. Other extensions and applications
are available. In a companion paper (Gu et al. 2012) using exactly the same environment, instead
of studying incentive-feasible and efficient outcomes, we impose various alternative solution
concepts—e.g. Walrasian pricing or Nash bargaining—and study decentralized equilibria. We
show that it is possible, indeed easy, for these economies to exhibit complicated endogenous
dynamics, including cyclic, chaotic and stochastic (sunspot) equilibria. In all of these cases,
market activity fluctuates over time, either deterministically or randomly, based on self-fulfilling
prophecies concerning credit conditions. Based on this, we think the framework provides an
interesting setting in which to analyze credit markets, generally, and not just banking.
We close with a question Ken Burdett asked about the article: Should we be surprised by a
theory that predicts it is efficient to put agents into occupations they are good at? If the occupation
is, say, singing, it is obvious that people with good range, pitch, timbre, etc. are right for the job.
That is different, however, since we can all agree that music and hence musicians give people
direct utility. But no one likes bankers, just like no one likes dollars, for their own sake. People
like money for what it does, and we think it is useful to explain what makes a particular object an
efficient or an equilibrium medium of exchange, not just assume it enters in a particular ad hoc
way into preferences or constraints. Similarly, if we want to study banking, we think it is useful
to have a theory that is explicit about the frictions that give rise to a role for banks in the first
place. For us, this project was a step in that direction.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 4. Since γ b >γ a, it must be that U1(xb,yb)≥U1 (xa,ya). With deposits d, and since there is one
candidate banker in each group, the repayment constraint in group b becomes −λbρ(yb +d)+πbγ bU1(xb,yb)/r =0,
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where r =(1−β)/β. Therefore, we obtain
∂πb
∂d
= rλ
bρ
γ bU1
(
xb,yb
) .
The repayment constraint in group a is −λaρ(ya −d)+πaγ aU2 (xa,ya)/r =0, so that
∂πa
∂d
=− rλ
aρ
γ aU1 (xa,ya)
.
Increasing deposits from group a to b reduces the overall monitoring cost πaka +πbkb since
∂πa
∂d
ka + ∂π
b
∂d
kb =r
[
λbkbρ
γ bU1
(
xb,yb
) − λakaρ
γ aU1 (xa,ya)
]
<0,
where the inequality follows from U1 (xa,ya)≤U1(xb,yb), γ a ≤γ b, λb ≤λa and kb ≤ka. Hence, starting from d =0, only
d >0 can reduce total monitoring cost.
To prove the second part let (x˘a,y˘a) solve maxWa (x,y), s.t. the participation constraint for 2a only. If
π¯ ≡ rλ
b(yb + y˘a)
γ bU1
(
xb,yb
) ≤1
then it is optimal to set πb = π¯ , d = y˘a, and πa =0. Then γ¯ is defined as
γ¯ ≡ rλ
b(yb + y˘a)
U1
(
xb,yb
) .
This completes the proof. ‖
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider an example with U1 =x−y, U2 =u(ρy)−x, γ a =γ b, λa =λb =1, ω1 =ω2 =ω, and
ρa =ρ>1=ρb . Given ρ>1, we can have δa <δb, so that (x∗,a,y∗,a) is feasible in group a but (x∗,b,y∗,b) is not feasible
in group b. Here, we focus on the case where deposits in group b are PE. The condition δa >δa implies that y∗,a is not IF
in group a, so that deposits potentially have a role. Consider the situation in group b. In the first Case (a), agents in group
b do not have a commitment problem because δb ≤δb, although they do have inferior storage technology. Therefore,
making deposits in group b requires agents in group a produce more to make up for a lower return to sustain a given level
of consumption. The condition δaρ>(ρ−1)u′
(
ρya
)
insures that δa is high enough so that d >0 is PE. Case (b) is similar,
except agents in group b have a binding repayment constraint when δb >δb. Therefore they need to be compensated for
taking deposits to prevent default. A transfer from group a does just that, but it comes on top of the additional production
required from group a to cover for the loss in return. Hence, d >0 is PE if δaρ>δb +(ρ−1)u′
(
ρya
)
, which is stricter
than Case (a). Finally, if the commitment problem in group a is very severe, u′
(
ρya
)
will be large. In this case, if the
investment technology in group a improves, their commitment problem must be worse for d >0 to be PE.
The planner’s problem with no interaction between groups is given by (25). The first best is y∗i solving
ρiu′(ρiy∗,i)=1. Denote by yi, the level of yi that satisfies the repayment constraint at equality given δi. Also, Define δi
by
[
u(ρiy∗,i)−y∗,i]/(ρiy∗,i)=δi as the level above which the repayment constraint binds in group i at y∗,i. The next two
claims establish the result.
Claim 1. Deposits in group b are PE if
δa >δ
a
, δb ≤δb and δaρ>(ρ−1)u′
(
ρya
)
.
Proof Note that given xa2 and d, agents 1a has to produce ya such that xa2 =(ya −d)ρ+d. The repayment constraint is
u
[(
ya −d)ρ+d]− ya
ρ
≥δaρ(ya −d).
To show deposits in group b are PE, we show increasing d relaxes the repayment constraint in group a. Hence it must be
that at the allocation ya
(1−ρ)u′[(ya −d)ρ+d]+δaρ>0
δaρ>(ρ−1)u′[(ya −d)ρ+d]
So d >0 is PE at ya iff δaρ>(ρ−1)u′
(
ρya
)
, establishing the claim. ‖
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Claim 2. Deposits in group b are PE if
δa >δ
a
, δb >δ
b
and δaρ≥δb +(ρ−1)u′
(
ρya2
)
.
Proof When δb >δb, the solution to (25) in group b is yb. Deposits are incentive compatible only if agents 1a make a
transfer τ to agents 1b. The repayment constraint in group b with τ and d, evaluated at yb, is u(yb)−yb +τ ≥δb
(
yb +d
)
. By
definition, u(yb)−yb =δbyb and the minimum transfer τ that satisfies the constraint is τ =δbd. The repayment constraint
in group a is
u
[(
ya −d)ρ+d]− ya
ρ
−τ ≥δaρ(ya −d).
Substituting τ =δbd, we get
u
[(
ya −d)ρ+d]− ya
ρ
−δaρya +
(
δaρ−δb
)
d ≥0,
so the repayment constraint is relaxed whenever δaρ−δb ≥(ρ−1)u′ [(ya −d)ρ+d]. Evaluating at ya2, δaρ−δb ≥
(ρ−1)u′
(
ρya2
)
. This establishes the claim, and therefore completes the proof. ‖
Proof of Propositions 6-7. Problem (28) is a dynamic contracting problem with two-sided lack of commitment, and is
solved using results of Thomas and Worrall (1988). These deliver the following: ∃V˜1 such that V2(V˜1)=0; V2(V1)≥0
iff V1 ≤ V˜1; and V2(V1) is decreasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable. Hence, we can rewrite (28) as
V2(V1)= max
x,y,V1+1
U2 (y,x)+βV2(V1+1) (A.1)
s.t. (29), (30) and V˜1 ≥V1+1,
where we replace (31) by V˜1 ≥V1+1 (We also need V1+1 ≥0, but that is redundant given the repayment constraint βπV1+1 ≥
y.) We eventually determine V˜1, but first we solve (A.1) taking it as given. Letting μ1, μ2 and μ3 be multipliers on (29),
(30), and V˜1 ≥V1+1, necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution are
0 = U2x (y,x)+μ1U1x (x,y) (A.2)
0 = U2y (y,x)+μ1U1y (x,y)−μ2 (A.3)
0 = βV2′
(
V1+1
)
+βμ1 +βπμ2 −μ3. (A.4)
The envelope condition is V2′
(
V1
)=−μ1, which combines with (A.4) to yield
0=βV2′
(
V1+1
)
−βV2′
(
V1
)
+βπμ2 −μ3. (A.5)
Given V˜1, we consider separately: (1) V˜1 >V1; and (2) V˜1 ≤V1.
Case 1: V˜1 >V1. We describe the solution to (A.1) as a function of V1 ≥0. There are three possibilities: (1a) V1 ∈[0,V1);
(1b) V1 ∈[V1,V˜1]; and (1c) V1 > V˜1. We first need the following:
Claim 3. In Case 1, the solution to (A.1) is stationary if and only if V1 ∈[V1,V˜1].
Proof First assume the solution is stationary, which means V1+1 =V1. By (A.5), V1+1 =V1 implies either: μ2 =μ3 =0 or
μ2,μ3 >0. Suppose μ2,μ3 >0. Since μ2 >0 and the solution is stationary, (x,y) is on the stationary repayment constraint,
and it is to the left of P by virtue of (A.2) and (A.3). Type 1’s payoff associated with this allocation is V1 =V1+1 <V1.
However, μ3 >0 implies V1 =V1+1 = V˜1. This is a contradiction, since we are in Case 1, where V˜1 >V1.
So we cannot have μ2,μ3 >0, and we must have μ2 =μ3 =0. Then (A.2) and (A.3) imply (x,y)∈P , and given
stationarity, we can combine (29) and (30) to yield the stationary repayment constraint. Type 1’s payoff thus satisfies
V1 ≥V1, since by definition V1 is the payoff associated with the point where the stationary repayment constraint intersects
P . Also, given stationarity, U1 (x,y)/(1−β)=V1 =V1+1 ≤ V˜1. This establishes that stationarity implies V1 ∈[V1,V˜1].
To show the converse, start by assuming V1 ∈[V1,V˜1], and recall that (29), (30), V1+1 ≤ V˜1, (A.2), (A.3), and (A.5)
are necessary and sufficient for (A.1). Set μ2 =μ3 =0 and μ1 =−U2x /U1x . Set V1+1 =V1. Let (y,x) be the point on P
where U1 (y,x)=(1−β)V1. Then all of the relevant conditions are satisfied. Hence, V1 ∈[V1,V˜1] implies stationarity.
This establishes Claim 3. ‖
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Return to the analysis of (A.1) in Case 1, consider first (1a).
Claim 4. In Case (1a) V1+1 >V1.
Proof Now V1 ∈[0,V1). Suppose by way of contradiction that V1+1 ≤V1. First suppose V1+1 <V1. This implies μ3 >0,
by the strict concavity of V2 and (A.5). But μ3 >0 implies V1+1 = V˜1, and we have V˜1 >V1 since we are in Case 1. Thus
V1+1 = V˜1 >V1, which contradicts V1+1 <V1, since V1 < V1 in Case (1a). Now suppose V1+1 =V1. This contradicts Claim
3, which tells us that the solution is stationary if and only if V1 ∈[V1,V˜1], and in Case (1a) V1 ∈[0,V1). So cannot have
V1+1 ≤V1. ‖
Now consider Case (1b), V1 ∈[V1,V˜1]. By Claim 3 we know the solution is stationary and (x,y) is given by the
intersection of P and U1 (x,y)=(1−β)V1. Finally, consider Case (1c), where V1 > V˜1. This implies μ3 >0 by (A.5).
Therefore V1+1 = V˜1, and after one period we are back to Case (1b), although as we show below, this cannot happen once
we endogenize V˜1. In any event, we we are done with Case 1, and proceed to:
Case 2: V˜1 ≤V1. The following possibilities are now relevant: (2a) V1 < V˜1; (2b) V1 = V˜1; and (2c) V1 > V˜1. We need
the following:
Claim 5. In Case 2, the solution to (A.1) is stationary if and only if V1 = V˜1.
Proof To verify this, note that one can show that if the allocation is stationary then V1 = V˜1 following the proof of Claim
3. To show the converse, assume V1 = V˜1. Again, the first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient. It is easy to check
that these are satisfied by V1+1 =V1 = V˜1, an allocation (x,y) solving U1 (x,y)=(1−β)V˜1 and y=βπ V˜1, and multipliers
μ1, μ2, and μ3 given by the first-order conditions. This establishes Claim 5. ‖
We now return to (A.1). In Case (2a), where V1 < V˜1, V1+1 >V1 by an argument is similar to Case (1a). In Case (2b),
where V1 = V˜1, Claim 5 establishes V1+1 = V˜1 and the allocation is stationary. In Case (2c), where V1 > V˜1, V1+1 = V˜1
by an argument is similar to Case (1c), but we also show below that this cannot happen once we endogenize V˜1. This
completes the analysis of the solution to (A.1) for an arbitrary V˜1 ≥0.
We now need to find the value of V˜1 that makes (A.1) equivalent to (28)—i.e. we seek a solution to V2(V˜1)=0. We
consider separately the two possibilities shown in Figure 5: a loose stationary repayment constraint, where V1 <V1; and
a tight one, where V1 >V1.
Loose: x< x̂. We claim V˜1 =V1. To verify this, from the above results we know that V1 = V˜1 implies the optimal
allocation is stationary. Given the allocation is stationary, V2
(
V1
)=U2 (y,x)/(1−β), and we only need to find the
stationary solution to U2 (y,x)=0. This is the (y,x) that occurs at the (non-zero) intersection of the indifference curves
U2 (y,x)=0 and U1 (y,x)=V1 in Figure 5. Hence, with a loose repayment constraint V˜1 =V1. It is obvious from Figure
5 that V1 <V1 is equivalent to x< x̂. This establishes Proposition 6.
Tight: x> x̂. We now claim V˜1 = V̂1, using a similar argument. If we set V1 = V˜1 then the optimal allocation is
stationary. Thus, we need to find the best point (x,y) for 1 consistent with U2 (y,x)=0 and the stationary repayment
constraint. From the right panel of Figure 5, this is given by the intersection of participation constraint and repayment
constraint, which is V1 = V̂1. Again, it is clear from the figure that V1 >V1 is equivalent to x> x̂. This establishes
Proposition 7. ‖
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